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SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY V. BNSF 
RAILWAY CO. AND ITS EFFECT ON LITIGATION 
CHALLENGING BIA’S NEW RIGHTS-OF-WAY 
REGULATIONS 
 
Kaelen H. Brodie* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In April 2015, the Swinomish Tribe (Tribe) sued 
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) for 
trespass and breach of contract, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief.1 The Tribe alleged that BNSF was—and still is—violating a 
right-of-way easement agreement, which the Tribe and the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) granted to BNSF on July 19, 1991, 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-28 and 25 C.F.R Part 169. The 
easement allowed BNSF to run trains through the Swinomish Tribe 
Reservation to refineries at March Point, near Anacortes, 
Washington. The easement further required that, “unless otherwise 
agreed in writing, only one eastern bound train, and one western 
bound train (of twenty-five cars or less) shall cross the Reservation 
each day.”2 BNSF is now running six 100-car unit trains per week 
through the reservation in each direction, which is four times as 
many railcars per day as are permitted under the explicit terms of 
the agreement.3  
                                                                                                             
*Kaelen Brodie will graduate from Seattle University School of Law in May of 
2017. After graduation, Kaelen will clerk for the Honorable Commissioners 
Schmidt and Bearse at the Washington State Court of Appeals in Tacoma. He 
wishes to thank Chloe Thompson, Attorney at Snoqualmie Indian Tribe and 
adjunct professor of Indian law at Seattle University School of Law, as well as 
Sarah Lawson, attorney for Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, for their advice and 
edits. In addition, he would like to thank the staff of the American Indian Law 
Journal, including Tracey Cook-Lee and Danielle Bargala, for their support, 
advice, and edits. 
1 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Injunctive Relief, Trespass, and Breach 
of Contract, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2015), 2017 WL 132448. 
(The motion for summary judgement was heard Dec. 15, 2016 before the 
Honorable Robert Lasnik).  
2 Right-of-Way Easement—Burlington Northern, Swinomish Indian Tribe 
Community, at 10.  http://www.swinomish-
nsn.gov/media/43924/1991_sitc___bnsf_right_of_way_easement_v1_0.pdf 
3 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5.  
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The agreement placed a limitation on the ability of the Tribe to 
control the amount of traffic on the tracks. It stipulated that “[t]he 
number of trains and cars shall not be increased unless required by 
shipper needs,” but “[t]he Tribe agrees not to arbitrarily withhold 
permission to increase the number of trains or cars when necessary 
to meet shipper needs.” 4  BNFS has not asked the Tribe for 
permission to increase the number of trains running through the 
Reservation. This resistance is likely due, in part, to the fact that 
shipping crude is lucrative for BNSF, particularly with the current 
boom in oil production in the United States. 
Since 2008, crude oil production has nearly doubled, having 
increased from 5 million to 9.4 million barrels per day. 5   The 
uptick in production has put substantial pressure on railroads to 
transport the growing amount of crude oil to refineries. The 
increase in crude oil production has largely affected landlocked 
states that lack the ability to transport crude oil via pipeline or 
boat.6 Without pipelines or ships to transport oil, railroads now are 
the dominant method of crude oil transportation, particularly from 
the Bakken Shale Formation in northwestern North Dakota, eastern 
Montana, and southern Canada.  
The Tribe’s lawsuit has environmental and monetary 
consequences not only for the Tribe and BNSF, but also for 
companies shipping crude to the refinery in Anacortes. Tesoro 
Refining & Marketing Company (Tesoro) ships Bakken crude to 
Cherry Point, and the outcome of this case will have an enormous 
impact on how lucrative and worthwhile such an operation will be. 
Consequently, Tesoro filed a petition with the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB)7 on June 3, 2016, requesting “the STB 
to reaffirm that federal law protects the rights of shippers to 
                                                                                                             
4 Right-of-Way Easement, supra note 2.  
5 Petroleum and Other Liquids: U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f
=A (last visited Mar. 3, 2017). 
6 Assn. of American Railroads, U.S. Rail Crude Oil Traffic, 3 (Nov. 2015), 
available at 
https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/US%20Rail%20Crude%20Oil%20Traff
ic.pdf.  
7 Overview of the STB, SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD, 
https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (“The 
Surface Transportation Board is an independent adjudicatory and economic-
regulatory agency charged by Congress with resolving railroad rate and service 
disputes and reviewing proposed railroad mergers.”). 
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request and receive rail service... and further affirm that this right 
to service may not be infringed on the basis of contractual or other 
commitments and rights that may exist between a landowner and 
the railroad.” 8  The STB denied this petition on November 14, 
2016.9  
Tesoro is not the only oil company that has considered using a 
refinery at Cherry Point to refine crude oil. Shell Oil Products US 
(Shell) does not currently ship Bakken crude, but it does have a 
refinery at Cherry Point that receives crude oil by ship and pipeline 
from Alaska’s North Slope. 10  Shell intended to begin shipping 
crude oil by rail, but ultimately cancelled its plan to construct an 
additional rail spur at Cherry Point on October 6, 2016.11 Although 
the project inspired protests, Shell said it was calling off the project 
because of the falling price of crude oil, something that could 
quickly change based on prevailing market conditions. 12  Any 
expansion would further increase rail traffic through the 
Reservation.13 
On January 13, 2017, Judge Lasnik in the Western District of 
Washington granted in part and denied in part the Tribe’s motion 
for summary judgment. 14  He held that Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) does not preempt or 
                                                                                                             
8 Petition of Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co., LLC for Declaratory Order at 2, 
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. BNSF, (W.D. Wash. filed Apr. 7, 2015) 
(STB Finance Docket No. 36041) available at 
https://www.stb.gov/Filings/all.nsf/WEBUNID/04D6729A21B0BD6185257FC
A0048EBFB/$file/240861.pdf. 
9 Surface Transportation Board Decision, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. 
BNSF, (S.T.B. Nov. 14, 2016) (No. FD 36041) 2016 WL 6809953, available at 
https://www.stb.gov/decisions/readingroom.nsf/UNID/049FF70E922F20788525
806C00790CCF/$file/45330.pdf (“Given that the [Western District of 
Washington] has already denied a motion to refer the preemption issue to the 
[Surface Transportation] Board, that courts as well as the Board can decide 
issues involving § 10501(b) preemption in the first instance, and that the 
[Western District of Washington] has clearly expressed its preference to decide 
the preemption issue itself, the Board will decline to issue a declaratory order in 
this matter”). 
10 Shell Calls off Oil-by-Rail Projects in Anacortes, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD 
(Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article106568582.html (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF 
Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2016) (No. 2:15-cv-00543RSL) 2017 WL 
132448.  
14 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Swinomish Indian 
Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. C15-543RSL). 
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supersede the Indian Right-of-Way Act (IRWA), and the Tribe 
may move forward with a state law claim for damages, compelled 
disclosure, and an adjustment in rent.15 On the other hand Judge 
Lasnik also explained that, “an injunction limiting the type of 
cargo or the number of trains or cars crossing the reservation—
whether under a breach of contract, trespass, or estoppel theory—
those remedies are unavailable in this jurisdiction.”16 Thereafter, 
on June 8, 2017, the court reversed itself on the injunction issue 
and took the unusual step of granting the Tribe’s motion for 
reconsideration.17 The parties will now set a potential trial date.18 
Part I of this article will discuss the history of litigation 
between the Swinomish Tribe and BNSF (and its predecessors), 
the dangers of transporting crude oil, and the important statutes in 
question. Part II of this article will argue that BNFS is bound by 
the easement agreement and the guidelines set forth in the Indian 
Right of Way Act (IRWA). Further, the court must resolve any 
ambiguities in the IRWA, the ICCTA, and the treaty granting the 
Swinomish Tribe its reservation in favor of the Tribe. Part III of 
this article will argue that the BIA has the authority under IRWA 
to promulgate the new right-of-way regulations from 2015. 
However, those challenging the new regulations should pay 
attention to the outcome in this case, for it has the potential to 
influence any future challenge to the new regulations.  
Although this is seemingly a unique case, all tribes should heed 
the lessons learned by the Swinomish Tribe on how to negotiate all 
types of easements with private companies. If the easement 
negotiated under IRWA preempts the STB, the lessons for tribes 
are clear: in negotiating with private companies, tribes should: 1) 
expressly control and manage the action taking place on the tribal 
easement; 2) include a strict expiration date; and 3) include a 
provision which states that the ICCTA preemption provisions do 
not apply. If the STB preempts the contractual agreement between 
BNSF and the Tribe, tribes across the country should refrain from 
granting easements that impact interstate transportation–even if the 
tribe might otherwise be willing to do so if certain conditions are 
                                                                                                             
15 Id. at 17. 
16 Id. at 9. 
17 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, at 5, Swinomish 
Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. Jun. 8, 2017), (No. 2:15-cv-
00543RSL) 2017 WL 132448. 
18 Id. 
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included in the contract–if tribal enforcement of those conditions 
attempt to regulate what can be shipped, pumped, or transported in 
any way. In this case, those conditions may be null and void, and 
the tribe could be giving up control over such rights-of-way 
indefinitely.  
 
I. PART I: FACTUAL HISTORY AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
The 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott reserved the Swinomish 
Reservation for the Tribe’s “exclusive use;” the land is held by the 
United States in trust for the Tribe.19 Around 1889, the Seattle and 
Northern Railroad Company (SNRC), a predecessor to BNSF, 
began constructing a rail line through the reservation. 20  The 
Secretary of the Interior at the time informed the SNRC that a 
treaty or congressional legislation was necessary to create a right-
of-way, but SNRC built tracks through reservation land without the 
permission of the Tribe or the federal government anyway.21 The 
United States government took no action against SNRC.22  
The Burlington Northern Railroad Company (BN) (the 
successor to SNRC) applied for a right-of-way with the BIA on 
September 27, 1977. The Tribe objected, and the application was 
subsequently denied by the superintendent of the BIA’s Western 
Washington Agency on October 17, 1978.23 BN appealed to the 
BIA Area Director and to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs 
of the Department of the Interior, who both affirmed the 
superintendent.24 BN then brought the complaint to federal court in 
Burlington Northern v. Andrus. 25  The district court stayed its 
ruling until an opinion in Watt, a separate case out of the Ninth 
Circuit, was issued.26 The Watt Court held that BIA’s construction 
of the Act of March 2, 1899 to require tribal permission before a 
right-of-way could be granted across tribal land was reasonable.27 
Although the Act of March 2, 1899 did not specifically require 
                                                                                                             
19 Treaty of Point Elliott, art. 2, 12 Stat. 927 (1855). 
20 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 3. 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Amended Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Swinomish Indian Tribal 
Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (W.D. Wash. July 21, 2016) (No. 2:15-cv-00543).  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 5. 
26 Id.; see also Rights-of-Way over Indian Land, 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 (2016); Nev. 
Pub. Power Dist. v. 100.95 Acres of Land, 719 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1983). 
27 S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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tribal permission, it directed the Secretary to “make all needful 
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with sections 312-318 of this 
title, for the proper execution and carrying into effect of all the 
provisions of said sections.”28 The 1948 General Rights-of-Way 
Act did require tribal permission;29 the court noted that both Acts  
“pertain to rights-of-way across Indian lands and share a common 
purpose: the preservation and protection of Indian interests.” 30 
Subsequently, summary judgment was entered against Burlington 
Northern in Andrus.31  
 
A. The Settlement Agreement 
 
All the while, in separate litigation, the Tribe pressured the 
federal government to act to prevent BN from trespassing on tribal 
land. The Tribe brought a trespass action against BN in 1978.32 
Although the litigation surrounding the trespass suit went on for 
over a decade, it was ultimately settled in 1990.33 The Settlement 
Agreement executed on July 19, 1991 formally granted permission 
to BN to use the rail line.34 However, that permission was qualified 
with certain conditions:  
 
Burlington Northern agrees that, 
unless otherwise agreed in writing, 
only one eastern bound train, and 
one western bound train, (of twenty-
five (25) cars or less) shall cross the 
reservation each day. The number of 
trains and cars shall not be increased 
unless required by shipper needs. 
The Tribe agrees not to arbitrarily 
withhold permission to increase the 
number of trains or cars when 
                                                                                                             
28 Act of March 2, 1899, ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318 
(1976)). 
29 1948 General Rights-of-Way Act, Pub.L. No. 80-407, 62 Stat. 17 (codified 
in 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (1976)). (“No grant of a right-of-way over and across 
any tribal lands... shall be granted without the consent of the proper tribal 
officials”). 
30 Watt, 700 F.2d at 554. 
31 Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 5-6. 
32 Swinomish Tribal Community v. Burlington Northern, Inc., No. C78-429V 
(W.D. Wash. filed July 18, 1978).    
33 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 6. 
34 Right-of-Way Easement, supra note 2, at 14. 
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necessary to meet shipper needs. It is 
understood and agreed that if the 
number of crossings or the number 
of cars is increased, the annual rental 
will be subject to adjustment in 
accordance with paragraph 3(b)iii of 
this Right-of-Way Easement and 
paragraph 2(b)iii of the Settlement 
Agreement.35  
 
The Agreement also grants BN a 40-year right-of-way 
easement with two twenty-year options to BN. 36  The 
Interior Department approved the easement on November 
27, 1990.37 
 
B. The Dangers of Transporting Crude Oil by Rail 
 
The Tribe argues that it can reasonably deny BNSF permission 
to run six 100-car unit trains per week in each direction because of 
the inherent dangers associated with transporting crude oil and the 
proximity of the rail line to critical cultural practices, such as 
fishing, and economic infrastructure, such as the Swinomish 
Casino and Lodge. The United States has concluded that the 
transportation of Bakken crude by train is “unique[ly] 
hazardous.”38 Derailment is more likely to occur when transporting 
crude oil because “[t]he trains are longer, heavier in total, more 
challenging to control, and can produce considerably higher buff 
and draft forces which affect train stability.”39 Moreover, Bakken 
                                                                                                             
35 Id. at 10. 
36 Id. at 7. 
37 Motion for Summary Judgment supra note 13, at 8.  
38 Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order (Order) by the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067 (May 7, 
2014), 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Hazmat/Final
_EO_on_Transport_of_Bakken_Crude_Oi_05_07_2014.pdf. 
39 PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN. AND FED. R.R. ADMIN., 
FRA & UNITED STATES PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY 
ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA) REPORT, OPERATION SAFE DELIVERY UPDATE (July 
23, 2014), 
http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Hazmat/07_2
3_14_Operation_Safe_Delivery_Report_final_clean.pdf. (“In addition, these 
trains can be more challenging to slow down or stop, can be more prone to 
derailments when put in emergency braking, and the loaded tank cars are stiffer 
and do not react well to track warp which when combined with high buff/draft 
forces can increase the risk of derailments.”). 
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crude is more flammable than other types of crude oil.40 Serious 
accidents involving trains carrying crude oil are common in the 
United States and Canada and are increasingly likely to result in 
“death... or substantial endangerment to health, property, or the 
environment.”41  
The following list of other accidents from around the country 
illustrate the potential harm the Tribe would face if an accident 
were to occur on its Reservation:  
 
• On March 7, 2015, a Canadian National Railway 
train carrying crude oil derailed, damaging a bridge 
over a waterway and dropping five cars into the 
waterway.42  
• On March 5, 2015, a BNSF train carrying Bakken 
crude derailed near Galena, Illinois. 43  Six cars 
derailed and two ruptured and caught fire despite 
being a newer model car known as the CPC-1232, 
which was specifically and voluntarily adopted by 
the industry to keep ruptures from occurring.44 
• On February 16, 2015, a train carrying Bakken 
crude with CPC-1232 cars derailed 33 miles 
southeast of Charleston, West Virginia, causing 20 
cars to catch fire. Although the spill spared the 
nearby Kanawha River, the explosion and fire 
destroyed a home and caused the evacuation of two 
towns nearby.45  
                                                                                                             
40 Id. (“[Bakken] crude has a higher gas content, higher vapor pressure, lower 
flashpoint and boiling point and thus a higher degree of volatility than most 
other crudes in the U. S., which correlates to increased ignitability and 
inflammability. The Congressional Research Service has reported that the 
properties of Bakken shale oil are highly variable, even within the same oil 
field.”). 
41 Id. (“The number and type of petroleum crude oil railroad accidents described 
below that have occurred during the last year is startling... Releases of petroleum 
crude oil, subsequent fires, and environmental damage resulting from such 
releases represent an imminent hazard as defined by 49 U.S.C. 5102(5), 
presenting a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal 
injury, or substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment may 
occur.”). 
42 Jeffrey Hodgson, Canadian Nat'l Crude Train Derails in Ontario, on Fire, 
Leaking, REUTERS (Mar 7, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/canada-us-
canada-derailment-idCAKBN0M30M520150307 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
43 BNSF: Oil Train Derailment Near Galena Involved Safer Tank Cars, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-galena-
train-derailment-20150305-story.html. (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
44 Id.  
45 Edward McAllister, Derailed CSX Train in West Virginia Hauled Newer-
Model Tank Cars, REUTERS, (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
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• On July 24, 2014, a BNSF train carrying nearly 100 
cars of crude oil derailed right in the heart of Seattle 
despite being on new track and only going five 
miles per hour. Fortunately, no leakage occurred.46  
• On April 30, 2014, 15 cars on a train carrying 
Bakken crude derailed in Lynchburg, Virginia, 
resulting in a massive explosion and spilling up to 
30,000 gallons of oil into the James River.47 
• On November 8, 2013, twenty-five cars derailed 
near a trestle in rural Alabama sending flames high 
into the sky that could be seen from 10 miles away. 
Hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil spilled into 
a wetland which eventually feeds into the 
Tombigbee River.48 
• On December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude oil 
collided with a derailed train carrying grain, causing 
a “massive fireball” prompting the Federal Aviation 
Administration to put flight restrictions in place 
over the smoky area and residents from the nearby 
town of Casselton to evacuate to Fargo.49  
• On July 6, 2013, a Montreal, Maine & Atlantic 
Railway train shipping Bakken Crude in DOT-111 
cars derailed in Lac-Megantic, Quebec. The 
explosion and fire killed 47 people and destroyed 
the downtown area of Lac-Megantic. In response, 
Canada banned the DOT-111 cars from carrying oil, 
requiring instead the use of TC-177’s which are 
made of thicker steel.50 
                                                                                                             
usa-train-derailment-csx-idUSKBN0LK1ST20150217 (last visited Mar. 10, 
2017). 
46 Lynda Mapes, Oil Train Derails in Interbay in Seattle, No Spills, SEATTLE 
TIMES: THE TODAY FILE, (July 24, 2014: 5:44 AM), 
http://blogs.seattletimes.com/today/2014/07/73125/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
47 Selam Gebrekiden, CSX Train Carrying Oil Derails in Virginia in Fiery Blast, 
REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-railways-accident-
virginia-idUSBREA3T0YW20140430 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
48 Verna Gates and Edward McAllister, Crude Oil Tank Cars Ablaze after Train 
Derails in Alabama, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2013),  
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-crude-train-explosion-
idUSBRE9A70Q920131109 (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
49 Daniella Silva, Mile-long train carrying crude oil derails, explodes in North 
Dakota, NBC NEWS (Dec 30, 2013), 
http://usnews.newsvine.com/_news/2013/12/30/22113442-mile-long-train-
carrying-crude-oil-derails-explodes-in-north-dakota. 
50 Giuseppe Valiante, DOT-111 Rail Cars That Burned In Lac-Megantic Banned 
For Oil Use, HUFFINGTON POST, July 25, 2016, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/07/25/garneau-confirms-dot-111-cars-won-t-
be-able-to-transport-crude-oil-as-of-nov-1_n_11183574.html.  
2017] Swinomish v. BNSF 562 
 
 
 
C. The Common-Carrier Obligation 
 
BNSF argued it is obligated by the STB—formerly the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—to transport as much 
cargo as it is asked to, as long as that amount is reasonable. This is 
the common-carrier obligation. The history of the common-carrier 
obligation extends back centuries to a time before railroads even 
existed.51 The fundamental idea was that no customer able to make 
payment and making a reasonable request for a service offered to 
the public at large could be denied. 52  Some researchers have 
observed that the rules governing common carriers gradually arose 
from the need to mitigate the dangers of monopolization and to 
maximize overall economic efficiency.53 In 1701, an English court 
found that:  
 
If a man takes upon him a public 
employment, he is bound to serve the 
public as far as the employment 
extends; and for refusal an action 
lies, as against a farrier refusing to 
shoe a horse, against an innkeeper 
refusing a guest when he has room, 
against a carrier refusing to carry 
goods when he has convenience, his 
wagon not being full.54  
 
In return for this reduced discretion, a common carrier often 
received certain benefits, such as limited liability.55  
These common-law concepts are firmly established in 
American statutes and jurisprudence. In 1901, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a telegraph company is a common carrier, 
and as such, is “performing a public service” to which “all 
                                                                                                             
51 Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common 
Carriage, 18 TELECOMM. POL'Y 435, Sec. II (1994). 
52 Id. 
53 See e.g., Harry M. Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation--The Silent Crisis, 
34 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 306-07 (1969); see also Guido Calabresi, Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 507 
(1961). 
54 Lane v. Cotton, 1Ld.Raym. 646, 654 (1701, per C.J. Holt). 
55 Eli M. Noam, supra note 51, at Sec. II. 
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individuals have equal rights both in respect to service and 
charges.” 56  The United States government also codified many 
common-law concepts. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act 
of 1887 (ICA) set out the duties of common carriers and many 
rules by which they must abide.57 Today, “[a] rail carrier providing 
transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Board 
under this part shall provide the transportation or service on 
reasonable request.”58 “Commitments which deprive a carrier of its 
ability to respond to reasonable requests for common carrier 
service are not reasonable.”59 
 
D. The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act 
(ICCTA) 
 
Prior to the ICCTA, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) regulated interstate commerce, including trucking, bus lines, 
and telephone companies.60 When Congress passed the Interstate 
Commerce Act (ICA) and created the ICC, its purpose was to 
achieve by administrative control, a “proper relationship between 
railway corporations and the general public,” one that “consist[ed] 
... just and fair standards ... to make specific orders as to rates and 
service and to enforce prompt obedience to these orders.”61 At the 
end of the 19th century, modern production depended on railway 
transportation. 62  Uniform regulation was needed in order to 
prevent “monopolistic industrial combinations,” which led to 
“railway discrimination in rates and service for the benefit of one 
person, locality, or kind of traffic. This, in turn, prejudiced and 
                                                                                                             
56 W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U.S. 92, 99–100 (1901). 
57 Pub. L. 95-473 and Pub. L. 97-449 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C Title VI 
§ 6018, Dec. 18, 1991). 
58 49 U.S.C § 11101(a) (2015).  
59 Id. 
60 49 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10311 (1994) (repealed 1995); See generally Interstate 
Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-2205 (1994) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 
101-80504 (2012)) [hereinafter ICA]; See also Mark F. Kightlinger, Nihilism 
with a Happy Ending? The Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
Emergence of the Post-Enlightenment Paradigm, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 113, 136 
(2008). 
61 ISIAH LEO SHARFMAN, REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERLYING 
PROBLEM IN RAILWAY ECONOMICS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION, 191-92 (LaSalle Extension University, 1st ed. 1915). 
62 Id. at 6. 
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disadvantaged rival shippers, places, and industries.” 63  In 
upholding the authority of the ICC (over the States) to fix rates, the 
Supreme Court noted that “interstate carriers [were] instruments of 
interstate commerce,” and Congress had “the right to control their 
operations in all matters having such a close and substantial 
relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or 
appropriate to the security of that traffic [and] to the efficiency of 
the interstate service...”64  
In 1999, Congress granted exclusive authority over all rail 
transportation in the United States to the Surface Transportation 
Board when it passed the ICCTA.65 In addition to the common 
carrier requirement, the ICCTA described the Board’s jurisdiction 
as follows:  
 
The jurisdiction of the Board over— 
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies 
provided in this part with respect to rates, 
classifications, rules (including car service, 
interchange, and other operating rules), practices, 
routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and 
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, 
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, 
team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if 
the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State, 
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this 
part, the remedies provided under this part with 
respect to regulation of rail transportation are 
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under 
Federal or State law.66 
 
With such broad language, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a broader 
statement of Congress’s intent to preempt state regulatory authority 
over railroad operations.”67  
 
                                                                                                             
63 Id. at 23; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of 
America's Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2012). 
64 Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914). 
65 ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 101-106, 109 Stat. 803, 
804 (1995) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 101-727 1995)). 
66 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2015). 
67 City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 
1581 (N.D. Ga 1996)).  
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E. The Indian Right of Way Act (IRWA) and the Regulations 
Promulgated Thereunder68 
 
Regulation and control of tribal land by Congress has an erratic 
and contradictory history. Inevitably, westward expansion and 
tribal territories came into serious conflict with the addition of 
Texas to the Union and the Californian Gold Rush; consequently, 
the federal government began to create reservations for Indians in 
the late 1840s.69 In 1854, Commissioner of Indian Affairs George 
W. Manypenny argued it would be necessary “at no distant day, to 
restrict the limits of all the Indian tribes upon our frontiers, and 
cause them to be settled in fixed permanent localities, thereafter 
not to be disturbed.”70 By 1872, the attitude that tribes would not 
be disturbed was replaced by the idea that Indians should 
eventually abandon their nomadic and communal reservations and 
assimilate into popular society.71 Acting on this belief, Congress 
passed the Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act of 1887.72 The 
Dawes Act authorized the president to allot reservation land to 
Indians and open any remaining land to non-Indian settlement. 
Around 1900, Congress passed legislation which formed a 
“comprehensive scheme which completely covers the subject of 
rights of way” and began to grant rights-of-way across reservation 
land.73  
The IRWA empowers the Secretary of the Interior to “grant 
rights-of-way for all purposes, subject to such conditions as he 
may prescribe, over and across any [tribal lands...”74 Those who 
are granted rights-of-way “shall comply with the provisions of 
sections 312 to 318 of this title and such rules and regulations as 
may be prescribed thereunder.”75 The purpose of this scheme was 
                                                                                                             
68 Compare 25 U.S.C §§323-28 (2015) with 25 C.F.R. Pt. 169 (2017). 
69 FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 58-59, 63 (2012 ed.) 
(Indian tribes often ceded large swathes of land in exchange for retaining control 
over a small portion of the land). 
70 Comm’r Ind. Aff., Ann. Rep., S. Exec. Doc. No. 33-1, at 225 (1854). 
71 COHEN, supra note 69, at 61.  
72 Indian General Allotment Act, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (2015)).  
73 Paul E. Frye, Section 1813 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005: Implications for 
Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Sufficiency, 42 TULSA L. REV. 75, 75 (2006) 
(quoting Plains Elec. Generating & Transmission Coop. v. Pueblo of Laguna, 
542 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1976).  
74 25. U.S.C § 323 (2013). 
75 25 U.S.C § 312 (2012). Congress passed Sections 311 to 321, which 
concerned rights-of-way for specific purposes circa 1990. Congress enacted 
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to protect Indian Nations “against improvident grants of rights-of-
way”76 and to “fully... protect Indian interests.”77  
 
F. An Overview of the Legal Arguments 
 
At a cursory glance, it might seem like BNSF has clearly 
violated a valid contract, but it is far more complicated than that. 
At the heart of the conflict is—as it has been for the last century—
the extent of tribal sovereignty. On the one hand, BNSF argued 
that the ICCTA preempts the part of the Agreement which—in its 
view—unreasonably limits commerce because federal authority to 
regulate railroads is exclusive. The STB, then, as the agency 
responsible for following the mandate of the ICCTA, is in the best 
position to “determine whether the relief requested by the tribe 
would impermissibly conflict with the statutes and regulations 
governing rail obligations, and if so, how the conflict should be 
resolved.”78  
On the other hand, the Tribe believes that the increase in crude 
oil passing through the Reservation presents a danger to people, 
recreation, and the environment. The railroad passes very close to 
the Swinomish Casino and Lodge, a Chevron station, an RV park, 
a Tribal waste treatment plant, and a Tribal air quality monitoring 
facility, all of which are part of the hub of commerce and culture 
on the Reservation.79 Hundreds of people are present at any given 
time at these facilities.80 The right-of-way also passes over Padilla 
Bay and the Swinomish Channel, which connect to the Puget 
Sound where the Tribe has its “usual and accustomed fishing 
grounds.” 81  Since time immemorial, the Puget Sound has 
supported the fishing lifestyle of Northwest tribes, “and other 
                                                                                                             
Sections 323 to 328 in 1948 to provide rights-of-way for all purposes. Congress 
did not include the requirement that Tribes consent to the right-of-way until 
1948. The Supreme Court interpreted the consent provision in the 1948 General 
Rights-of-Way Act to apply to Sections 311 to 321. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. 
Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir. 1983). 
76 Loring v. United States, 610 F.2d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1979). 
77 S.P. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1983). 
78 Defendant BNSF Railway Company’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay, at 11-12, 
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., (No. C15-543RSL) (W.D. 
Wash. May 14, 2015), 2017 WL 132448. 
79 Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 2. 
80 Id. 
81 United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020, 1049 (W.D. Wash. 1978). 
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marine resources have played central and enduring roles in the 
Tribe’s subsistence, culture, identity, and economy.”82 
The Tribe argued that the Indian Right-of-Way Act of 1948 
(IRWA), under which the Department of Interior granted the 
easement, is integral to any decision the court makes because it 
governs how the BIA grants easements and when the easements 
may be revoked. 83  Because the IRWA applies, the court must 
consider whether the IRWA and the ICCTA are in conflict. The 
Tribe argues the two statutes can be read to function harmoniously 
because they have obviously unrelated purposes. 84  Lastly, the 
Tribe argues that both statutes must be interpreted liberally in favor 
of tribal rights, and consistent with the Indian law canons of 
construction.85 
BNSF responds by arguing that the Tribe’s withholding of 
consent to additional railcars passing through the Reservation is 
contrary to federal law both because the contract between the Tribe 
and BNSF is preempted by the ICCTA and because it is contrary to 
other federal laws.86  
 
II. PART II.  THE TRIBE IS NOT ARBITRARILY WITHHOLDING ITS 
CONSENT TO AN INCREASE IN TRAIN TRAFFIC 
 
BNSF argued that the tribe cannot withhold consent to an 
increase in train traffic because this would violate federal law, and 
the IRWA could not have sanctioned a contract which would 
violate federal law.87 If true, this would also violate the Settlement 
Agreement on its face because “nothing” in the easement “shall 
supersede any federal law or regulation.” 88  In support of the 
argument that the agreement violates federal law, BNSF makes 
two points: first, the common-carrier obligation requires BNSF to 
                                                                                                             
82 Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 3. 
83 Id. at 14-15. 
84 Id. at 19. 
85 Id. at 21-22. 
86 BNSF Railway Company’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 12, Swinomish 
Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL (W.D. Wash. Jan. 13, 
2017), 2017 WL 132448. 
87 25 C.F.R. § 169.9 (2015) (Rights-of-Way “(a) [a]re subject to all applicable 
Federal laws; and (b) [a]re subject to tribal law; except to the extent that those 
tribal laws are inconsistent with Federal law”). 
88 Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 23, at 7. 
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provide transportation of crude oil; second, withholding consent 
violates the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (hereinafter 
Hazmat Act).89 Instead of addressing these arguments head on, the 
Tribe argues that “[e]ven the STB does not read the [ICCTA] 
federal preemption provision literally.”90 
 
A. Withholding Consent is Not Arbitrary; Whether the 
Agreement Violates the Hazmat Act or the Common Carrier 
Obligation is Not Dispositive 
 
For the Tribe, the notion of “arbitrariness,” as derived from the 
settlement agreement, should not be based on an understanding of 
the practicality and the necessity of uniform regulatory practices; 
rather, it should be based on its objection to a significant increase 
of dangerous cargo passing through critical areas of the 
Reservation. Nothing in BNSF’s briefing attempts to rebut the 
Tribe’s assertion that oil traffic threatens harm to people and 
sacred hunting grounds, or attempts to controvert the 
reasonableness of the Tribe’s objection to increased crude oil 
traffic. Instead, BNSF argues that it is per se unreasonable for the 
Tribe to object to the increased traffic because states are prevented 
from doing so, and because the federal government sufficiently 
regulates the transportation of hazardous materials to keep 
localities safe.  
Nothing in the Hazmat Act expressly prevents the Tribe from 
contracting with BNSF in such a way as to limit the number of oil 
trains running through the Reservation. The Hazmat Act is an 
extensive and comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to 
regulate the transportation of hazardous material. It states: 
“[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this section 
and unless authorized by another law of the United States, a 
requirement of a state... or a[n]... Indian tribe about [the 
transportation of hazardous material] ... is preempted.” 91  The 
Eighth Circuit has interpreted the Hazmat Act to prevent the 
Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community from 
implementing an ordinance requiring transporters of nuclear 
materials travelling across reservation land to obtain a tribal 
                                                                                                             
89 49 U.S.C.App. §§ 5108-5128 (2013).  
90 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 16. 
91 49 U.S.C § 5125(1) (2013). 
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license.92 Like the ICCTA, however, nothing in the Hazmat Act 
mentions—let alone prohibits—contracting with a transporter, like 
BNSF, to limit the transportation of a hazardous material. 
Furthermore, the Hazmat Act has yet to generate litigation in 
which the parties claimed it conflicted with another federal statute.  
Initially, in his order on cross-motions for summary judgment, 
Judge Lasnik did not conclude that the Tribe’s withholding of 
consent was arbitrary as a matter of law, but he agreed with 
BNSF’s first argument that easement agreements cannot be used to 
prevent the railroad from meeting its common carrier obligations.93 
In 1948, the United States Supreme Court heard United States v. 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, a case in which the owner 
of a segment of track contracted with a railroad for use of that 
segment.94 Cleveland Union Stock Yards Company had attempted 
to impose certain fees on the rail company’s use of a particular 
track segment it used. The railroad companies balked at how high 
the fees were and refused to deliver livestock to the meatpackers at 
the other end of the spur, effectively excluding meat from the types 
of product that could be transported on the spur.95 The Supreme 
Court held that the ownership of the track segment in question 
“does not vest [the landowner] with power to compel the railroads 
to operate in a way which violates the Interstate Commerce Act.”96 
Similarly, Judge Lasnik held that an injunction preventing the 
transportation of crude oil through the reservation was not an 
appropriate remedy because this “state law claim” would 
“effectively require a common carrier to discriminate against a 
particular type of cargo and/or a particular region” and “burden[] 
interstate commerce.”97 This discrimination, he said, “goes to the 
heart of the railroad’s operations as a carrier and flies in the face of 
the anti-discrimination purposes for which the Interstate 
Commerce Act was first enacted.98 
                                                                                                             
92 Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian 
Cmty., 991 F.2d 458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1993). 
93 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 4. 
94 United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 333 U.S. 169, 176-77 (1948). 
95 Id. at 173-74.  
96 Id. at 177-78. 
97 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 10. 
98 Id. Judge Lasnik also concluded that “BNSF’s promises to disclose the cargo 
it carries across the reservation, to seek the Tribe’s written agreement prior to 
increasing the traffic over the rail line, and to pay an adjusted rental amount do 
not constitute the regulation of transportation by rail carriers or involve the 
abandonment or discontinuance of track.” Id. at 9.  
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However, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is “simply 
inapposite because it involved state law claims; it did not involve 
an Indian tribe seeking to protect its treaty protected property 
interests under federal law.” 99 Judge Lasnik correctly recognized 
this oversight and granted the Tribe’s motion for 
reconsideration. 100  “Federal common law governs an action for 
trespass on Indian lands,”101 and federal common law provides a 
variety of causes of action to protect Indian lands, such as actions 
for ejectment, accounting for profits, and damages.102 Just recently, 
the Western District of Oklahoma issued a permanent injunction 
ejecting the operator of a network of natural gas transmission 
pipelines from Kiowa Tribal land, and because the judge found the 
federal common law trespass claim. 103  Thus, Judge Lasnik was 
correct to permit or exclude the Tribe’s federal common law 
claims; those should move forward without the limitation of 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. 
 
III. PART III. THE ICCTA DOES NOT PREEMPT ENFORCEMENT 
OF THIS CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT 
 
As discussed above, BNSF argued that, because the IRWA 
does not authorize an action which would violate federal law, the 
court need not even consider whether the ICCTA preempts the 
right-of-way agreement. Whether the ICCTA preempts the 
enforcement of the right-of-way agreement is a separate and 
important question. If the ICCTA preempts the contractual 
agreement, the remedies provided by the IRWA are rendered moot, 
and the principles of economic efficiency as understood by the 
STB apply to conflicts over the termination or negotiation of a 
right-of-way agreement.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
99 Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, at 4, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. 
v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL (W.D. Wash. March 10, 2016), 2017 WL 
132448. 
100 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 5. 
101 United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United 
States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544, 1549 n.8 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
102 Pend Oreille, 28 F.3d at 1549 n.8. 
103 Order, at 9-10, Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 
2017), (No. 5:15-cv-01262-M). 
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A. The ICCTA Does Not on its Face Preempt the Right-of-
Way Agreement Simply Because the Agreement is a Contract 
 
ICCTA’s mandate to the STB to regulate interstate 
transportation is broad and sweeping, but is not absolute. First, 
“[s]tate and local regulation is appropriate where it does not 
interfere with rail operations. Localities retain their reserved police 
powers to protect the public health and safety so long as their 
actions do not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.” 104 
Second, contracts are recognized as “voluntary agreements [that] 
must be seen as reflecting the carrier's own determination and 
admission that the agreements would not unreasonably interfere 
with interstate commerce.” 105  If every contractual arrangement 
between a rail carrier and another party was preempted, the parties’ 
exclusive recourse would be ICCTA remedies, but the ICCTA 
does not include a general contract remedy. 106  The STB itself 
follows these two limiting principles and often emphasizes that 
courts are the proper place for resolving contract disputes. 107 
However, in both cases, whether it is a local regulation or a 
contractual arrangement, the validity and enforceability is limited 
to the extent it unreasonably interferes with interstate commerce or 
the common carrier’s obligations.108 
 
 
                                                                                                             
104 Grafton & Upton R.R. Co., FD 35779, 2014 WL 292443, at *5 (S.T.B. Jan. 
22, 2014). 
105 The Twp. of Woodbridge, NJ, et al., 5 S.T.B. 336, 3 (2000).  
106 PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 218-19 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
107 See, e.g., Id. at 220 (citing The N. Y., Susquehanna, & W. Ry. Corp.--
Discontinuance of Service Exemption, No. AB-286 S.T.B. 1, 2 (2008) (rejecting 
stay based on claim that NYS & W did not fulfill contract obligation to “operate 
and maintain the [rail system] improvements” because “a court of competent 
jurisdiction is the proper forum to resolve contractual disputes, not the Board”); 
Saginaw Bay S. Ry. Co. –Acquisition & Operation Exemption, No. 34729 
S.T.B. 1, 3, 2006 WL 1201791, at *2 (S.T.B. May 5, 2006) (“[W]hether SBS 
should be responsible for maintaining or indemnifying that portion of the line is 
a private contractual dispute subject to the terms of the agreement under which 
CSXT has made the assignment ... contractual disputes such as this one are 
properly for the courts to decide.”); see also 49 U.S.C. § 10709(c)(2) (2013) 
(providing that contracts between rail carriers and shippers, which are not 
subject to rate requirements of the ICCTA, must be enforced in state or federal 
court). 
108 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 8.  
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1. The ICCTA Could Preempt the Enforcement of the Right-
of-Way but for the IRWA and the Canons of Construction 
 
In this case, Judge Lasnik concluded in his order granting the 
Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgement in Part and Denying it in 
Part that he could not grant the Tribe’s requests for relief to the 
extent they would unreasonably interfere with interstate 
commerce.109 In the first case relied upon by the Tribe, Township 
of Woodbridge v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, the STB denied 
Consolidated Railroad’s motion to dismiss in a case where citizens 
had sued to enjoin the railroad from idling its trains in the town.110 
The Township and Consolidated entered into a contractual 
relationship in which the Consolidated agreed to limit the idling of 
trains between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. 111  The township then 
sought reassurance from the STB that Consolidated could be held 
to the agreement. 112  The STB ruled that Consolidated had not 
shown that enforcement of the contract between the township and 
Consolidated would unreasonably interfere with the railroad’s 
operation.113 However, the court later pointed out that the railway 
company is not precluded from attempting to demonstrate in the 
future that enforcement of the contract may interfere with interstate 
commerce.114 Similarly, in PCS Phosphate v. Norfolk Southern the 
Fourth Circuit said that a deed obligating Norfolk Southern 
Railroad to pay for the relocation of a portion of track was not 
preempted because the obligation would not interfere with Norfolk 
Southern’s ability to serve its existing customers.115 In these cases, 
although the court held that the contractual agreements were not 
preempted by the ICCTA, it did not disregard such a possibility. 
The PCS Phosphate court emphasized that “[t]his is not to say that 
a voluntary agreement could never constitute an ‘unreasonable 
interference’ with rail transportation.”116 Rather, preemption turned 
on the facts of each case.117  
                                                                                                             
109 Id. at 10. 
110 Woodbridge, 5 S.T.B. at 1. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2. 
115 PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 222 (4th Cir. 2009). 
116 Id. at 221; see also R.R. Ventures—Aban. Exemption—Between 
Youngstown, Ohio, & Darlington, Pa., in Mahoning & Columbiana Ctys., Ohio, 
& Beaver Cty., Pa., AB 556 (Sub-No. 2X), slip op. at 3 (S.T.B. served Jan. 7, 
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B. Federal Courts Should Hold that the Plain Language of the 
ICCTA Does Not Outweigh the Trust Responsibility Between the 
Federal Government and Indian Tribes 
 
Whether the ICCTA preemption provision prevails over a 
different federal law governing Indian tribes when that law 
conflicts with the ICCTA appears to be an issue of first impression. 
Phosphate and Woodbridge do not involve a contract authorized 
by a federal statute, the IRWA, and sanctioned by the BIA (in the 
Department of the Interior). To be clear, state and local regulation 
is preempted with few exceptions,118 but the Tribe is correct to 
point out that the “ICCTA has never been held” to preempt other 
federal statutes.119 However, this is not because courts reject the 
preemption provision of the ICCTA; rather, it is because “there has 
never been a case in which another federal remedy was being used 
to conflict directly with the STB’s exclusive regulation of rail 
transportation.” 120  And, this case is not just about any federal 
remedy, this case involves the trust doctrine, a sacred 
responsibility which courts have respected for over a century. 
 
1. Courts Have Held that the ICCTA Does Not Supersede Other 
Federal Acts, But Such Circumstances are Limited and Did Not 
Present Serious Conflicts; No Such Holding Has Had Significant 
Economic Impacts 
 
Courts have had limited opportunity to interpret how 
preemption applies when the ICCTA and other federal statutes 
cover the same topic or are in conflict. Most significantly, although 
                                                                                                             
2000) (“While the Board encourages privately negotiated agreements, any 
contractual restrictions that unreasonably interfere with common carrier 
operations are deemed void as contrary to public policy.”), aff’d sub nom. R.R. 
Ventures v. STB, 299 F.3d 523, 560-63 (6th Cir. 2002). 
117 PCS Phosphate, 559 F.3d at 221. 
118 Joint Petition for Declaratory Order, Boston & Maine Corp. & Town of Ayer, 
MA, STB Fin. Docket No. 33971, WL 4586855, 500 S.T.B. 500, 5 (S.T.B., 
Apr.30, 2001). (“State and local regulation is permissible where it does not 
interfere with interstate rail operations, and localities retain certain police 
powers to protect public health and safety. For example, non-discriminatory 
enforcement of state and local requirements such as building and electrical 
codes generally are not preempted.”). 
119 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 16. 
120 BNSF Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
86, at 27. 
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the plain language of “section 10501(b) [of the ICCTA] might 
suggest that it supersedes other federal law, the [Surface 
Transportation] Board and the courts have rejected such an 
interpretation as overbroad and unworkable.”121 In some instances, 
the ICCTA does not preempt other federal acts.122 In Tyrell, the 
court attempted to harmonize section 10501(b) of the ICCTA with 
the Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA). It found that the mere 
existence of the FRSA indicates Congress’s intent for the STB and 
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to have different 
mandates, and the history of coordination between the agencies 
reflects that the FRA handled safety matters, and the STB handled 
economic regulation and environmental impact assessments. 123 
The importance of the case, however, was more about who had the 
proper mandate, rather than parsing a conflict between two 
statutes, such as the IRWA and the ICCTA.   
Some local environmental zoning ordinances or land use 
restrictions have been upheld in a few contexts, but these cases are 
limited to when the local entity has another federal grant of power. 
The STB concluded that Congress did not intend the ICCTA to 
preempt the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act 
(CWA), which both involve local governments, in permitting and 
regulation.124 However, even when another federal agency grants 
certain powers to a local entity, the STB could still argue that 
regulation must not “interfere with interstate rail operations....”125 
Courts will seek to determine this on an individual basis and 
                                                                                                             
121 C.S.X. Trans., Inc.—Pet. for Decl. Order at 1, (S.T.B. Mar. 14, 2005) (No. 
34662) 2005 WL 1024490. 
122 See, e.g., Holland v. Delray Connecting R. Co., 311 F. Supp. 2d 744 (N.D. 
Ind. 2004) (“ICCTA did not preempt Coal Act to extent it required railroad to 
pay annual premiums to union health benefit plan”); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v. 
Albany & E.R.R. Co. 741 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Or. 2010) (ICCTA does not 
preempt the Sherman Act); Boston and Maine Corp. and Town of Ayer, 
MA, 500 S.T.B at 5. (“[N]othing in section 10501(b) is intended to interfere 
with the role of state and local agencies in implementing Federal environmental 
statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, the [Clean Water Act], and the [Safe Water 
Drinking Act]”); and Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry., 248 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.2001) 
(“[T]he ICCTA and its legislative history contain no evidence that Congress 
intended for the STB to supplant the FRA's [Federal Railroad Administration] 
authority over rail safety. Rather, the agencies' complementary exercise of their 
statutory authority accurately reflects Congress's intent for the ICCTA and 
FRSA [Federal Railway Safety Act] to be construed in pari materia.”). 
123 Tyrell, 248 F.3d at 523.  
124 Borough of Riverdale Petition for Declaratory Order the N.Y. Susquehanna 
& W. Ry. Corp., 4 S.T.B. 380, 5 (1999). 
125 Id.   
575 American Indian Law Journal [Vol. 5:308 
 
 
whether the “statute or regulation is being applied in a 
discriminatory manner or being used as a pretext for frustrating or 
preventing a particular activity, in which case, the application of 
the statute or regulation would be preempted.”126 For example, the 
STB noted that Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adoption 
of local regulation of train emissions would be preempted.127 The 
STB rarely abdicates such authority and certainly has never done 
so when the contract or local regulation so limited interstate 
commerce.  
 
C. When Two Federal Laws Seemingly Conflict, One Does 
Not Normally Preempt the Other; Rather, Courts Try to 
Harmonize Them; There is No Evidence Congress intended to 
Abrogate the IRWA upon Enacting the ICCTA 
 
The Tribe argues that, as the ICCTA preemption provision is 
not workable, courts must attempt to harmonize the ICCTA and 
the IRWA.128 Preemption of a federal law by another federal law 
does not make sense in the context of the Supremacy Clause—both 
laws have equal power.129 So, when federal acts conflict, courts 
attempt to harmonize the statutes or determine whether one act 
impliedly repeals another.130 “[I]f two federal statutes are ‘capable 
of coexistence,’ the statutes should be harmonized and each should 
be regarded as effective unless there is a ‘positive repugnancy’ or 
an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the laws.”131 In BNSF Railway 
Company v. California State Board of Equalization, BNSF and 
Union Pacific Railroad Company challenged a California law 
which required the railroads to collect a fee for the State Board of 
Equalization from the shippers of hazardous materials.132 The court 
                                                                                                             
126 Joint Petition for Declaratory Order, Boston & Maine Corp. & Town of Ayer, 
MA, 5 S.T.B 5080, 6 (2001); see also, Grafton & Upton R.R. Co.—Petition for 
Declaratory Order, FD 35779, 2014 STB LEXIS 12, at *15 (S.T.B. Jan. 27, 
2014) (“[F]ederal environmental law would be preempted if the “federal 
environmental laws are being used to regulate rail operations”). 
127 U.S. EPA—Pet. For Declaratory Order, F.D. No. 35803 (S.T.B. Dec. 30, 
2014). 
128 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 18. 
129 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
130 Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2014). 
131 Assn. of Am. Railroads v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1094 
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Town of Ayer, 500 S.T.B at 6, n.28); see also, Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).  
132 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 16-cv-04311-RS, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149884, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2016) 
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granted the railroads’ request for an injunction, reasoning that “it is 
not for the state effectively to instruct that entity as to what must 
be included in rail shipping charges.”133 In doing so, however, it 
noted that the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) 
permits states to impose fair fees,134  and it is not the fact of a fee 
that triggers preemption by the ICCTA, but rather the way in 
which the fee was collected. The HMTA and the ICCTA could be 
harmonized if the fee was placed “directly on shippers, or on 
railroads themselves” and if it did not discriminate between 
railroads and other modes of transportation.135 
Similarly, the Sierra Club sued BNSF arguing that BNSF 
violates the CWA every time coal is discharged from a train car 
into waters of the United States because it has never obtained a 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit. 136  The court denied the parties’ motions for summary 
judgement because it believed issues of material fact remained 
outstanding; it “postpone[d] its decision on the ICCTA preemption 
issue until after a possible finding of liability at trial.” 137  The 
parties settled out of court,138 but the briefing indicated BNSF did 
not believe that the statutes could or should be harmonized. Rather, 
BNSF argued that federal law cannot be harmonized with ICCTA 
when it is “being used to regulate rail operations directly or being 
applied in a discriminatory manner against railroads.”139  
                                                                                                             
133 Id. at *11. 
134 49 U.S.C. § 5125(f) (2013) ("A State, political subdivision of a State, or 
Indian tribe may impose a fee related to transporting hazardous material only if 
the fee is fair and used for a purpose related to transporting hazardous material, 
including enforcement and planning, developing, and maintaining a capability 
for emergency response."). 
135 Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, No. 16-cv-04311-RS, at *10, *14. 
136 Order Denying Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Motions for Summary Judgment 
at 1, Sierra Club v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C13-967-JCC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
147786, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 25, 2016). 
137 Id. at 37. 
138Phuong Le, BNSF to Study Coal Covers Under Tentative Lawsuit Agreement, 
THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2016, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/environment/enviros-bnsf-railway-reach-agreement-in-coal-dust-lawsuit/ 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2017) (“BNSF denied any violations of federal 
environmental laws, but also agreed to pay $1 million in environmental projects 
in the state and to clean up certain hotspots where coal has accumulated along 
tracks near waterways.”) 
139 BNSF Railway Company's Motion for Summary Judgment, Sierra Club v. 
BNSF, 2016 WL 4721022  (W.D.Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) (Nos. 2:13-cv-00967-
JCC, 2:14-cv-00660) (citing In re EPA Petition, (S.T.B. Dec. 29, 2014) (No. 
35803) 2014 WL 7392860. 
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In this case, Judge Lasnik stated the issue is not whether the 
ICCTA preempts IRWA, but rather “whether Congress intended to 
repeal the Treaty of Point Elliott when it enacted the ICCTA.”140 
Unlike California State Board of Equalization or Sierra Club v. 
BNSF, this case involves the treaty right to exclude non-
members. 141  Only an act of Congress or the Executive can 
extinguish treaty rights, including the Treaty of Point Elliott, if 
there is “clear evidence that Congress actually considered the 
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian 
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by 
abrogating the treaty.”142  “The intention to abrogate a treaty or 
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed by the Congress,”143 
and Judge Lasnik found no evidence of such intent. 144  He 
concluded that the ICCTA does not preempt or repeal the 
Treaty.145  
 
D. The ICCTA and the IRWA Should Be Construed in Favor of 
Indian Rights; Considering This, the ICCTA Cannot Preempt the 
IRWA 
 
Judge Lasnik found that the ICCTA did not preempt the 
IRWA, and he did so in large part on the basis that there was no 
evidence Congress intended to abrogate the treaty rights. The 
canons of construction are critical in this analysis as they apply to 
treaty rights and they may apply to the interpretation of statutes. 
Like the CWA, the IRWA is a federal statute granting federal 
agencies the right to issue administrative rules governing the 
granting of rights-of-way on tribal land. Given the extent of federal 
control, trust responsibilities apply to the granting of rights-of-
way,146 as do the classic canons of construction, instructing courts 
                                                                                                             
140 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 3. 
141 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986). The right to exclude non-
members from the reservation is “too fundamental to be easily cast aside.”  
142 Id. at 739-40. 
143 Cook v. U.S., 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). 
144 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 
14; see also Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 
17, at 4. 
145 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 
16. 
146 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 223-24, 225 n.29, 226 n.31 (1983) 
(hereinafter Mitchell II). 
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to construe treaties and regulations liberally in favor of Indians.147 
Given the trust doctrine and the canons of construction, BNSF 
should be held to the express language of the contract. The court 
could grant an injunction until the parties determine what amount 
of traffic across the reservation is reasonable considering the 
dangers of crude oil transportation.  
The concepts of the trust responsibility and protection are 
inherent in the very first treaties negotiated between Indians and 
the United States Government.148  John Marshall, the first Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, described the 
Cherokee Nation as a “domestic dependent nation[]” 149  and 
summarized the relationship between tribes and the United States 
as “marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist 
nowhere else.” 150  Congress codified this trust relationship in 
several statutes. For example, the Northwest Ordinance, passed by 
Congress in 1787 stated:  
 
The utmost good faith shall always 
be observed towards the Indians, 
their lands and property shall never 
be taken from them without their 
consent; and in their property, rights 
and liberty, they shall never be 
invaded or disturbed . . . but laws 
founded in justice and humanity 
shall from time to time be made, for 
preventing wrongs being done to 
them, and for preserving peace and 
friendship with them.151 
 
Over the last century, the trust relationship has survived a variety 
of permutations. The U.S. Supreme Court has both expanded and 
then limited its influence. During the “Allotment Era,” in which 
                                                                                                             
147 Star Lake R.R. v. Lujan, 737 F. Supp. 103, 109 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 925 
F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
148 See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, 124-37 (Oxford U. Press 
1997). 
149 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
150 Id. at 16. 
151 See “An Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States 
Northwest of the river Ohio,” July 13, 1787 art. 3, in 32 Journals of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 334, 341 (Worthington C. Ford et al., eds. 
1904-37). 
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Congress opened many reservations to non-Indian settlement, the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s decision to both 
unilaterally abrogate a treaty and apply federal criminal laws to 
Indians.152 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the guardian-ward 
relationship was both the source and the justification for this 
“plenary” power,153  which Congress readily used to limit tribal 
sovereignty.154  
The canons of construction are as old as the trust relationship. 
“The canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in 
the unique trust relationship between the United States and the 
Indians.”155 In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice John Marshall 
interpreted the treaty between the Cherokee Tribe and the federal 
government—the Treaty of Hopewell of 1785—as the “unlettered 
people” would have understood it.156 The Treaty indicated that the 
tribal lands were “allotted” to the Tribe, which, of course, had a 
particular legal connotation. However, Marshall explained it was 
highly unlikely the Cherokee Nation had understood that “instead 
of granting, they were receiving lands.”157 “Therefore, he read the 
term from the tribe's perspective, as merely establishing a ‘dividing 
line between the two nations.’”158  
The federal trust responsibility limits the power of the 
executive branch of the federal government in three ways. First, 
                                                                                                             
152 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903) (holding Congress did not 
have to abide by the treaty requiring consent of three-fourths of adult male 
members for any allotment of land to non-Indians because it would materially 
limit and qualify the controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and 
protection of the Indians, and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, to 
partition Indian land without consent); see also United States v. Kagama, 118 
U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, 
which inter alia gave federal courts jurisdiction of some crimes committed on 
reservation land even between Indians).  
153 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384. 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (quoting Kagama 
to uphold statute making it a crime to introduce liquor into Indian country); and 
Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902) (invoking political 
question doctrine to upholding Congress’s ability to lease reservation land 
without tribal consent); and Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 485 
(1899) (quoting Kagama and invoking political question doctrine in upholding 
Congress’s ability to determine membership in tribe).  
155 Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (quoting Oneida Cty. 
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985)). 
156 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (McLean J., concurring).  
157 Id. at 553 (Majority Opinion). 
158 Jacob Schuman, Indian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1102 
(2013) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552). 
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the “[general trust] represents the historical obligation of the 
federal government to protect tribal lands and tribal self-
government.”159 This general trust also serves to restrain alienation 
of Indian land and requires the Secretary of the Interior to approve 
all leases on Indian land.160  
Second, a general statute may give rise to obligations 
enforceable by suit, but such “limited trust” does not permit 
actions for damages.161 In Mitchell I, the Quinault Nation sued the 
federal government under the General Allotment Act (GAA) 
claiming mismanagement of its timber resources and the proceeds 
from timber sales. 162  Although the language of section five of 
GAA required the United States to hold land in trust for the Tribe, 
the court held that section five created only a limited trust 
relationship between the United States and the Tribe, and it did not 
impose upon the federal government any duty to manage timber 
resources.163 
Third, when a statutory scheme contemplates “elaborate 
control” over Indian land and resources, the United States may be 
liable for damages under a theory of fiduciary responsibility.164 In 
Mitchell II, the Quinault Nation brought the same claim again, this 
time, arguing that the timber management statutes and other 
federal statutes established fiduciary obligations between the Tribe 
and the federal government.165  The court agreed, finding that a 
fiduciary obligation existed that mandated the federal government 
to compensate the Tribe for mismanagement or forest resources.166 
The Tribe successfully used the trust doctrine to assert that the 
federal government had a positive duty to Indians, and where that 
duty was breached, the federal government could be sued for 
damages. 
Although the canons of construction and the trust relationship 
are incredibly important to Indian law, the extent to which they 
impact Indian law today is debatable. Modern jurisprudence does 
                                                                                                             
159 Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust 
Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources, 
71 N.D. L. REV. 327 (1995). 
160 Id. at 327-28.  
161 United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) (hereinafter Mitchell I).  
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 542-53. 
164 Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1983). 
165 Id. at 226. 
166 Id. 
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not explicitly apply the canons to federal statutes, particularly ones 
of general applicability. The U.S. Supreme Court originally only 
applied the canons to treaties, but in the early 1900’s, treaty 
making ceased as Indian policy creation shifted from the Executive 
Branch to Congress. 167 The Supreme Court expanded the canons 
to apply to statutes affecting Indians without noting the 
significance of the application. 168  The Nebraska District Court 
explicitly noted that these statutes were in effect treaties and, thus, 
should be interpreted and construed as though they were treaties.169 
More modern jurisprudence is, in large part, consistent with this 
principles. “[F]aced with . . . two possible [statutory] constructions, 
our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply 
rooted in [the Supreme] Court's Indian jurisprudence: ‘[s]tatutes 
are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with ambiguous 
provisions interpreted to their benefit.’”170 On the other hand, this 
method of statutory interpretation seems only to apply to statutes 
“enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians or for the regulation 
of Indian affairs,” rather than statutes of general application.171  
Moreover, courts sometimes “disregard[]” 172  the canons, 
especially when there are significant countervailing considerations 
or incongruous cannons.173 Canons are not “mandatory rules”174 
and “need not be conclusive.” 175  Detractors also criticize the 
canons for being “normative in a fuzzy, liberal”176 way and for the 
difficulty of determining the tribe’s original understanding of a 
                                                                                                             
167 Schuman, supra note 157, at 1103. 
168 Id. See also Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 109, 152 (2010). 
169 Conway v. United States, 149 F.261, 265-66 (C.C.D. Neb. 1907). 
170 Cty. of Yakima v. Confederated Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 
U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 
(1985); see City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (“ambiguities in federal statues are to be read liberally in favor of the 
Indians”). 
171 San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306, 1312 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
172 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569 (1981) (Blackmun, J. 
dissenting); see also David M. Blurton, Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis 
and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test of Judicial Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. 
REV. 37 (1999) (noting that Justice Thomas did not mention the canons at all in 
the Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie opinion). 
173 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).   
174 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). 
175 Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115. 
176 Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, 
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 381, 424 (1993). 
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document.177 However, these criticisms of the trust doctrine are not 
persuasive in this case.  
If the trust relationship and the canons of construction are to 
mean anything, when the BIA sanctions, permits, and approves 
contractual provisions under IRWA—a statute enacted for the 
benefit of Indians—those provisions should be interpreted 
considering the Tribe’s interests and its original understanding of 
the document. In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed several treaties and 
orders within the context of the canons of construction to assure 
the Chippewa Indians of their fundamental hunting and fishing 
rights.178 In so doing, the court emphasized that if Congress intends 
to nullify treaty rights, it must do so explicitly.179 An 1837 treaty 
between the Chippewa Bands of Indians ceded land to the United 
States, which, in turn, guaranteed to them certain hunting, fishing, 
and gathering rights. 180  President Taylor revoked the usufruct 
rights in an Executive Order of 1850, but in the subsequent Treaty 
of 1855, the Bands relinquished to the United States “any and all 
right” to land within the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere. The 
1855 Treaty did not mention whether it modified any of the terms 
from the original 1837 Treaty or hunting and fishing rights.181 In 
this context, the court concluded that the Treaty was ambiguous 
and resolved the tension “in favor of the Indians.” 182  The 
Swinomish Tribe protected itself from potentially unlimited 
violations of its tribal sovereignty, by including certain 
“conditions” in the easement agreement as allowed for in 
IRWA.183 There is no limit on what conditions can be imposed. 
Any ambiguity on what conditions may be imposed under IRWA 
should be resolved in favor of the Tribe. 
It would be manifestly unjust for the federal government and 
the federal courts to invalidate a contract, and provisions therein, 
which retained some of the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty. The 
                                                                                                             
177 Schuman, supra note 157, at 1104. 
178 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 188-93 
(1999); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (When Congress 
amended the Bald Eagle Protection Act to extent the ban on golden eagle 
hunting except by Indians with a permit it explicitly abrogated the treaty rights 
of the Tribe). 
179 Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196. 
180 Id. at 176. 
181 Id. at 184.  
182 Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
183 Easement Agreement, supra note 2. 
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Swinomish Tribe lamented that without “the conditions contained 
in the Easement Agreement,” or if it had known that “BN . . . 
considered the terms of the [grant] to be subordinate to ICC or 
common carrier obligations, [] the Tribe would never have granted 
its consent.” 184  Even without a treaty protecting a right, “a 
hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians 
from Indian lands.”185 Tribes have authority “[t]o determine who 
may enter the reservation; to define the conditions upon which they 
may enter; to prescribe rules of conduct; [and] to expel those who 
enter the reservation without proper authority.”186 With the treaty, 
the Tribe has the “exclusive” use of the land. In summary, the 
federal government would violate its trust responsibility by 
approving a contract that did grant some sovereignty, and then 
going back on its word to hold the portion of the contract in which 
the Tribe retained sovereignty invalid. To hold that the ICCTA 
preempts the agreement would amount to an unqualified injustice 
to tribes.  
Judge Lasnik properly considered the canons of construction in 
his ruling.187 The purpose of IRWA is to protect Indians “against 
improvident grants of rights-of-way”188 and to “fully . . . protect 
Indian interests.”189 For the federal government to so thoroughly 
reject a tenet of Indian sovereignty would completely undermine 
the stated purpose of the IRWA. With the canons, the court can 
prevent BNSF from using its common carrier obligations to dodge 
its contractual obligations and continue to perpetuate a history of 
Indian subjugation. 
Despite this, Judge Lasnik initially found the injunction 
remedy unavailable to the Tribe because it would “fly[] in the face 
of the anti-discrimination purposes for which the Interstate 
Commerce Act was first enacted.” If the ICCTA is preempted, it 
should not then be used to justify the denial of an injunctive 
remedy for the Tribe. Similarly, why should the Tribe seek a 
declaration from the STB of its contractual rights if the ICCTA is 
                                                                                                             
184 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
185 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982). 
186 Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976). 
187 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 
12. 
188 Loring v. United States, 610 F.2d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1979). 
189 S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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not preempted?190 Ultimately, in granting the Tribe’s motion for 
reconsideration, Judge Lasnik correctly limits Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad Company to state law claims.191  
Despite rejecting the applicability of the ICCTA, Judge Lasnik 
did determine in the order on cross motions for summary judgment 
that any conflict between the IRWA and the ICCTA is not 
irreconcilable, but he fails to explain why this is so under the facts 
of Swinomish v. BNSF.192 There is no doubt, BNSF will argue on 
appeal that the conflict is irreconcilable. As the Tribe admits, 
“[b]oth enactments have provisions applicable to railroads, even if 
the policies behind those provisions are very different.” 193 
Patchwork easements negotiated separately with different tribes 
that may have different priorities and conditions will likely 
frustrate the policy of the ICCTA—to prevent railroads from being 
subject to “new and conflicting regulatory obligations that will 
vary as a train travels across different jurisdictions.” 194  Judge 
Lasnik notes that “between 1980 and 1995 the courts and the ICC 
recognized the ‘primary responsibility and presumably greater 
expertise of the Department of the Interior over tribal affairs.’”195 
After the ICCTA was enacted, the STB continued to recognize the 
BIA’s expertise and right to handle disputes between Tribes and 
those entities that hold a right-of-way. 196  Judge Lasnik’s 
conclusion that “BNSF has not shown that compliance with these 
provisions would impose an unreasonable burden on interstate 
                                                                                                             
190 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 
18. 
191 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 17, at 2. 
BNSF again points out that the ICCTA’s preemption provision applies to federal 
and state law, but seemingly forgets the court has already rejected the 
applicability of the ICCTA and the blanket preemption on remedies under 
federal law. BNSF’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration at 3-4, 
Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. C15-543RSL (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 13, 2017), 2017 WL 132448. 
192 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 
14. 
193 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 19. 
194 Defendant BNSF Co.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Sierra Club v. BNSF 
Railway Co., 2016 WL 4721022 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016) 
195 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 15 
(citing N.M. Navajo Ranchers Ass’n v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 702 F.2d 
227, 232-33 (D.C Cir. 1983)). 
196 See Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Alaska, Alaska R.R. 
Construction and Operation of a Rail Line Extension to Port MacKensie, No. 
35095, 2010 WL 1266781, at *562 (S.T.B. Mar. 16, 2010). 
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commerce” 197  is untenable—there is an inevitable economic 
conflict. Until now, it appears there has not been a significant 
conflict, but to grant the Tribe’s injunction would have a 
significant impact on BNSF’s common carrier obligations and 
crude oil transportation to Cherry Point. 
While this case is unique, if the ICCTA preempts the IRWA, 
the new BIA right-of-way rules would be swallowed by the 
ICCTA insofar as no tribe would be allowed to terminate a grant of 
right-of-way. BNSF or another railroad would simply claim that 
the agreement impeded its common carrier obligations. For such a 
drastic unsettling of BIA administrative procedure, the Court 
should require explicit intent from Congress, as it does when 
Congress abrogates a treaty right.  
 
IV. PART IV: THE IRWA AND THE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION 
MUST PREEMPT THE ICCTA OR MUCH OF THE NEW RULES ON 
RIGHTS-OF-WAY PROMULGATED BY THE BIA IN 2015 IS RENDERED 
INEFFECTUAL 
 
The validity of the BIA’s new regulations as they pertain to 
railroads and other areas regulated by the STB is threatened if the 
ICCTA preempts the IRWA in Swinomish v. BNSF or if the Tribe 
is unable to hold BNSF accountable using federal remedies for its 
continued violations of the right-of-way agreement. BIA’s 
argument that it does have authority to promulgate the new rules is 
relevant to the extent that it shows a clear grant of federal 
administrative power that conflicts with the ICCTA. If the BIA has 
authority to grant tribes the power to unilaterally terminate a right-
of-way or to limit the range of use permitted under a right-of-way, 
then holding that the ICCTA preempts the IRWA in Swinomish v. 
BNSF does not merely threaten the BIA’s new rules—indeed, 
some of the regulations may be void. On the other hand, if the BIA 
has no authority to promulgate the new rules, the authority of the 
STB and the BIA may not conflict. While the new regulations are 
probably in keeping with federal law, they will likely be tested in 
federal court because it is not sufficiently clear what provisions in 
a right-of-way agreement would violate federal law and what 
would not. A court trying to determine if a provision in a right-of-
way agreement violated federal law would have to consider 
                                                                                                             
197 Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 9. 
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whether the provision granted a tribe civil or criminal jurisdiction 
in violation of existing federal law. 
On March 11, 2016, the Western Energy Alliance (Alliance)198 
sued the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the BIA in the 
United States District Court for the District of North Dakota 
seeking injunctive relief and to block new rules regarding rights-
of-way on tribal land.199 The Alliance mounted a facial challenge 
to the new rule arguing that it exceeded the authority of the 
Secretary of the DOI because, inter alia, tribes cannot unilaterally 
terminate a right-of-way or regulate the conduct of non-Indians on 
federally granted rights-of-way.200 The complaint did not mention 
common carrier obligations or the ICCTA. The district court held 
that the Alliance failed to show that, on balance, the court should 
grant an injunction.201 This ruling doesn’t end litigation on the new 
rules; it only means that Alliance must now show “concrete and 
particularized harm” because of the new rules as required by the 
United States Supreme Court standing jurisprudence.202 
 The BIA last made material modifications to the right-of-
way regulations in 1968 and has now updated many of the 
outdated aspects of the old rules.203 One of the significant changes 
to the new regulations promulgated by the BIA allows for the tribe 
to unilaterally terminate those rights-of-way granted after 
implementation of these rules.204 The new regulations require the 
Secretary’s grant of any right-of-way to clarify that it does not 
diminish to any extent: 
                                                                                                             
198 The Alliance: Who We Are, WESTERN ENERGY ALLIANCE, 
https://www.westernenergyalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). The 
Alliance is an “alliance of stakeholders” who “represent the voice of the 
Western oil and natural gas industry in a variety of ways.” 
199 Complaint, Western Energy Alliance v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 
(March 11, 2016) (16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM). 
200 Id. at 4. 
201Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, Western 
Energy Alliance v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM 
(April 19, 2016); See Dataphase Systems, Inc., v. C L Systems Inc., 640 F.2d 
109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981).  
202 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Lujan v. Def. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992).  
203 Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 4, Western 
Energy Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior, No. 16-cv-00050-
DLH-CSM, (March 30, 2016). The new rules are promulgated at: Rights-of-
Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72492-72549 (Nov. 19, 2015). 
204 Rights of Way on Indian land, 25 C.F.R. § 169.403(a) (2015) (A grantee and 
a tribe can negotiate remedies that may “provide one or both parties with the 
power to terminate the grant...”).  
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(a) The Indian tribe's jurisdiction over the land 
subject to, and any person or activity within, the 
right-of-way; 
(b) The power of the Indian tribe to tax the land, 
any improvements on the land, or any person or 
activity within, the right-of-way; 
(c) The Indian tribe's authority to enforce tribal law 
of general or particular application on the land 
subject to and within the right-of-way, as if there 
were no grant of right-of-way; 
(d) The Indian tribe's inherent sovereign power to 
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members on 
Indian land; or 
(e) The character of the land subject to the right-of-
way as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. 1151.205 
 
The new rules also emphasize that right-of-way grants “[a]re 
subject to all applicable federal laws” and tribal law “except to the 
extent that those tribal laws are inconsistent with applicable federal 
law.”206 
In fact, the STB claims complete control of the termination of 
railroad rights-of-way. The ICCTA, which grants the STB 
exclusive jurisdiction over the “construction, acquisition, 
operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, 
team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities,” 207  is in direct 
opposition to the current rules promulgated under IRWA. The 
2015 rules state:  
 
Any abandonment, non-use, or violation of the 
right-of-way grant or right-of-way document, 
including but not limited to encroachments beyond 
the defined boundaries, accidental, willful, and/or 
incidental trespass, unauthorized new construction, 
changes in use not permitted in the grant, and late or 
insufficient payment may result in enforcement 
actions including, but not limited to, cancellation of 
the grant [by BIA in consultation with the tribe].208 
                                                                                                             
205 Rights of Way on Indian Land, 25 C.F.R. §169.010 (2015). (A grantee and a 
tribe can negotiate remedies that may “provide one or both parties with the 
power to terminate the grant…”). 
206 Id. §169.009. 
207 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2) (2013). 
208 25 C.F.R. §169.401 (2015). 
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In addition, §169.403 allows for the tribe and the grantee to 
negotiate a termination provision that would execute in the case of 
a violation of the agreement without the permission of the BIA or 
any other federal agency.209 
These provisions are not precisely at issue in Swinomish v. 
BNSF because the Tribe is not seeking termination of the right-of-
way, but, if it were, BNSF noted in its cross-motion for Summary 
Judgement that such action as it pertained to railroads would again 
be preempted by the ICCTA.210 The Tribe is also concerned that 
the expiration of the Easement Agreement no later than 2071 
would be seen by BNSF as an “impermissible interference with its 
common carrier obligations and would be preempted by the 
ICCTA.”211 Indeed, counsel for BNSF did not object to the court’s 
observation at the motion to dismiss hearing that “you’re not going 
to abide by the termination agreement in the lease either.”212 
 
A. The BIA Has Authority to Grant Rights-of-Way with 
Conditions 
 
In its suit against the BIA, Western Energy Alliance argued 
that the new rules expand tribal jurisdiction in violation of federal 
law. While the BIA can certainly attach provisions to any grant,213 
                                                                                                             
209 25 C.F.R. §169.403 (2015). The previous iteration of the right-of-way rules, 
which also is arguably in conflict with the ICCTA states: “[a]ll rights-of-way 
granted under the regulations in this part may be terminated in whole or in part 
upon 30 days written notice from the Secretary mailed to the grantee at its latest 
address furnished in accordance with §169.5(j) for any of the following causes: 
(a) Failure to comply with any term or condition of the grant or the applicable 
regulations; (b) A nonuse of the right-of-way for a consecutive 2-year period for 
the purpose for which it was granted; (c) An abandonment of the right-of-way. If 
within the 30-day notice period the grantee fails to correct the basis for 
termination, the Secretary shall issue an appropriate instrument terminating the 
right-of-way.” 25 C.F.R. § 169.20(a) (2012). 
210 Cross-Motion and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement, 
supra note 86, at 24, n28. 
211 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 13; Chicago & N.W. Tr. 
Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981) (ICC abandonment 
authority is plenary and exclusive); Transit Comm’n v. United States, 289 U.S. 
121 (1933) (ICC authority is exclusive for constructions of railroads). 
212 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 13. 
213 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK: GRANTS OF 
EASEMENT FOR RIGHT OF WAY ON INDIAN LANDS, § 1.2 (2006) (“The [right-of-
way] creates a non-possessory interest in the land which is a right to use or the 
right to restrict use of the property for a particular purpose. A ‘grant of easement’ 
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the Alliance argues the rules go too far and “bestow jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.”214  For example, the Alliance argues that the 
new rules restrict grantees’ property rights by requiring Tribal 
permission to assign the property both prospectively and 
retrospectively if the contract is silent as to assignment.215 On the 
contrary, “[r]ights-of-way are typically easements that do not 
convey fee title and may be limited to a specific use or purpose.”216 
Assignment is not an absolute right that is concomitant with rights-
of-way; rather, it is subject to contractual negotiation just as it 
would in a commercial lease. 
The Alliance further objects that 169.405(d), which covers 
remedies available for existing grants, would lead to unilateral 
termination of right-of-way grants in tribal court. It states: “[BIA] 
may invoke any other remedies available to us under the grant, 
including collecting on any available bond, and the Indian 
landowners may pursue any available remedies under tribal 
law.”217 Despite the Alliance’s concerns, it is not likely to be an 
available remedy because unilateral termination only applies 
prospectively.  
Any provision in a right-of-way agreement which either allows 
for unilateral termination or otherwise limits the activity of the 
grantee must not precluded by federal law. The criminal, civil, and 
regulatory jurisdiction of a tribe is a convoluted analysis and 
depends on whether an incident occurs on fee land—whether it be 
owned by a tribal member or a non-tribal member—or land held in 
trust. A right-of-way agreement might be considered a 
“regulation.” The Supreme Court has limited the civil regulatory 
jurisdiction of tribes over non-Indians on non-Indian-owned fee 
land. 218  Absent a specific federal statute or treaty, tribes 
                                                                                                             
for [a right-of-way] defines the type, extent, use, purpose, width, length, and 
duration of the [right-of-way].”). 
214 Complaint, supra note 198, at 6.  
215 Id. at 5. See also Right-of-Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492, 72,545 
(Nov. 19, 2014). 
216 United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 670, 676 (8th Cir. 2012). 
217 Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Western Energy 
Alliance v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM, (April 
4, 2016) (emphasis added). 
218 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Western 
Energy Alliance v. D.O.I, 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM (W.D. N.D. Apr. 4, 2016) 
(Fee land is that land owned in fee simple by Indians or non-Indians. Trust land 
is that land which is held in trust by the federal government. Except in Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), the “United States Supreme Court has not applied 
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presumptively do not retain civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-
Indians on non-Indian owned fee land within the reservation power 
except in two instances: 
 
Indian tribes retain inherent 
sovereign power to exercise some 
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on their reservations, even on 
non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may 
regulate, through taxation, licensing, 
or other means, the activities of 
nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its 
members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements. A tribe may also 
retain inherent power to exercise 
civil authority over the conduct of 
non-Indians on fee lands within its 
reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on 
the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of 
the tribe.219  
 
While phrased quite broadly, the Supreme Court tends to narrowly 
construe these exceptions, known as the Montana exceptions, 
particularly the second one.220 Threatening conduct only applies 
where the tribe may be in actual jeopardy, such as in an armed 
takeover of a tribe’s casino and government center by security 
guards, 221  or igniting forest fires. 222  In Montana, the Supreme 
Court highlighted several cases which it considered to be represent 
                                                                                                             
Montana to evaluate a tribe’s jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on trust or 
restricted lands.”). 
219 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (internal citations 
omitted). 
220 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
319 (2008) (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001)) (Except in 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408, 408 (1989), “this Court has never ‘upheld under Montana the extension of 
tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land’”). 
221 Attorney’s Process and Investigation Services v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d 
927, 936 (8th Cir. 2010). 
222 Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 849-50 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
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consensual relationships in retail sales, permitting, and taxes.223 
Since Montana, however, courts often analyze whether to apply 
the exceptions even in cases where the controversy arises from 
trust land. 
In Strate v. A1 Contractors, the court potentially expanded 
Montana’s applicability by applying it to the grant of a right-of-
way on trust land for a highway in North Dakota. In that case, 
neither Montana exception applied when an Indian is involved in a 
car accident on a right-of-way granted to the state with a car owned 
by a non-Indian contracting with the Tribe for landscaping. 224 
However, Strate did not say that all rights-of-way are fee land 
subject to the Montana exceptions. Rather, land ownership “is only 
one factor to consider” when evaluating whether Montana applies 
regarding a tribe’s jurisdiction over nonmembers, although it “may 
sometimes be a dispositive factor.”225 The Court limited Strate to 
the “particular matter:” the lands were the equivalent of fee land 
for tribal jurisdiction because the right-of-way was a state highway 
and “subject to the State’s control, the “[t]ribes [] consented to, and 
received payment for” the grant, and the Tribe “retained no 
gatekeeping right” to allow it to “assert a landowner’s right to 
occupy and exclude” nonmembers.226 
When the case and controversy arises on land held in trust or 
fee land owned by Indians and when there are minimal or no 
competing state interests in play, courts find that Montana does not 
apply.227 In Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. LaRance, the 
Ninth Circuit held the tribe had jurisdiction over the company and 
that the company’s owner operated a resort on rented tribal land. 
The court reasoned that the tribe’s status as landowner is enough to 
support regulatory jurisdiction without considering Montana 
                                                                                                             
223 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) 
(holding that a non-Indian suit against an Indian shop owner to collect goods 
sold to him on credit should be brought in tribal court); Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 
U.S. 384, 393 (1904) (upholding a permit tax on animals for non-Indians); 
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 948 (8th Cir. 1905) (upholding a permit tax for 
non-Indians who desire the right to conduct business on reservation); 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-
154 (1980) (upholding sales tax on tobacco products for non-Indians on tribal 
land). 
224 Strate v. A 1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457-58 (1997).  
225 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360. 
226 Id. at 455-56. 
227 Blaire M. Rinne, In Water Wheel, the Ninth Circuit Corrects a Limitation on 
Tribal Court Jurisdiction, 32 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 47, 55-56 (2012). 
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because the nonmember’s conduct “occurred on tribal land, the 
activity interfered directly with the tribe’s inherent powers to 
exclude and manage its own lands, and there are no competing 
state interests at play.”228 The Water Wheel court relied on Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe and New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, both of which supported its finding of tribal court 
jurisdiction without applying Montana.229 In Merrion, the Court 
upheld a tax imposed by the tribe on the oil and natural gas used or 
taken from the reserve by a non-Indian mining company. The 
Court found that “the power to tax is an essential attribute of 
Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-
government and territorial management.”230 However, perhaps the 
unintentional outcome of this jurisprudence is that when the tribe 
could potentially win a case where Montana is applied, the court 
instead determines that the tribe holds inherent sovereign authority. 
When courts do apply Montana, an exchange of money or 
other considerations is considerable evidence of a consensual 
relationship, but ownership of the land is significant. For example, 
the Montana Court held that a holder of a right-of-way who sold 
electricity to individual tribal members “constituted a ‘consensual 
relationship’ as defined by Montana.”231  On the other hand, in 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Company 
the court held that when an Indian couple sued a non-Indian bank 
for discriminatory lending practices, no consensual relationship 
existed.232 The Long family defaulted on its loans; the bank took 
ownership of the land and proceeded to sell it to non-Indians, but 
the family sued claiming the bank offered more favorable terms to 
                                                                                                             
228 Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 814 (9th 
Cir. 2011).  
229 See Water Wheel, 642 F.3d at 812 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
455 U.S. 130, 144-45 (1982); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 
U.S. 324, 330-31 (1983). 
230 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137. 
231 Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1051-52 (D. 
Mont. 1999); see also Reservation Tel. Co-op v. Henry, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 
1023 (D.N.D. 2003) (the consensual relationship exception “has no application 
to the facts of this case”); and Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine & 
Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 769, 772-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (no 
consensual relationship existed between the recipient of the grant and the tribe, 
but the court remanded for factual findings on whether the second Montana 
exception applied).  
232 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
320 (2008). 
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non-Indians than it had to Indians. 233  The Supreme Court held 
“that once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses 
plenary jurisdiction over it.”234 The resale of the land by the bank 
to non-Indians did not implicate either of Montana’s exceptions 
because “[a]ny direct harm to its political integrity that the tribe 
sustains as a result of fee land sale is sustained at the point the 
land  passes from Indian to non-Indian hands.”235 Because rights-
of-way, like the type granted to BNSF, do not convey fee title,236 a 
tribe should retain fee ownership or the federal government should 
retain the land in trust, but fee ownership is not always 
dispositive.237  
The Fifth Circuit walked a fine line between the two positions 
in Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians.238 In 
that case, John Doe, a 13-year-old Tribal member, sued 
Dolgencorp, the operator of a general store on trust land, and Dale 
Townsend, the manager of the general store, alleging sexual 
abuse.239 Dolgencorp argued that Plains Commerce Bank altered 
how courts should interpret the first Montana exception: in order to 
trigger tribal jurisdiction, the court must find that a consensual 
relationship exists and that it impacts self-governance or internal 
relations. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that “[i]t 
is hard to imagine how a single employment relationship between a 
tribe member and a business could ever have such an impact.”240 
This decision was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, 
suggesting that case law upholding a tribe’s civil jurisdiction in 
cases arising on trust land and from a simple consensual 
relationship is embattled and perhaps nearing its ineluctable end. 
                                                                                                             
233 Id. at 321-22. 
234 Id. at 328. 
235 Id. at 336, 338. 
236 See PROCEDURAL HANDBOOK, supra note 213; see also 7-60 THOMPSON 
ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITIONS § 60.02(c) (2015) (“The right in 
land held by an easement owner differs from the fee interest or even the 
leasehold interest in that it is a ‘use’ interest, but not a ‘possessory’ interest in 
land.”). 
237 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (quoting Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (“[T]he ownership status of land ... is only one 
factor to consider in determining whether regulation of the activities of 
nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations,’ though ‘[i]t may sometimes be a dispositive factor’”).  
238 Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 
(5th Cir. 2014) (aff’d by an equally divided Court in Dollar General Corp. v. 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, __ U.S. __ 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016)). 
239 Id. at 169. 
240 Id. at 175. 
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The BIA’s final rule simply states that the regulations “do not 
limit the tribe’s inherent sovereign power to exercise civil 
jurisdiction over non-members on Indian land” rather than define 
what the limit might be.241 Section 169 of the new regulations also 
add the grant of the right-of-way will not diminish to any extent [] 
[t]he Indian tribe’s jurisdiction over the land subject to, and any 
person or activity within, the right-of-way.” 242  However, if the 
Montana exceptions apply to a right-of-way grant, the BIA does 
conclude in its response to comments that, because tribal consent is 
required for a right-of-way, the grantee and the Tribe do enter into 
a consensual relationship. 243  But this “represents [the] BIA’s 
authoritative and contemporaneous interpretation of its own 
regulation and was itself the product of the same notice-and-
comment rulemaking.”244  Whether the BIA’s interpretation of a 
consensual relationship will prevail is unclear. 
Tribes could increase the probability that conditions placed on 
the right-of-way contract are valid by “includ[ing] [a] reservation 
of tribal dominion or control over the right-of-way”245 emphasizing 
the “landowners right to occupy and exclude.”246 When concluding 
that the ICCTA and the IRWA can be read in harmony, Judge 
Lasnik noted that the IRWA’s implementing regulations were 
recently revised and “do not include any mechanism for STB 
review of a right of way termination.” The Secretary of the Interior 
“does not share BNSF’s opinion that the ICCTA abrogated the 
BIA’s authority to terminate a railroad right of way across tribal 
lands.” Arguably, this only furthers the perception that the ICCTA 
and the IRWA really are in conflict. If so, until the issue is settled, 
tribes agree to the grant of rights-of-way to railroads and many 
other entities at their own peril without the knowledge that they 
retain inherent control. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The United States Government should hesitate before placing 
any limitation on the transportation of oil and other hazardous 
                                                                                                             
241 Right-of-Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,327, 72,504 (Nov. 19, 2015).  
242 25 C.F.R. § 169.10 (2016).  
243 Id. at 72, 504. 
244 Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 34, Western 
Energy Alliance v. D.O.I., 16-cv-00050-DLH-CSM (W.D. N.D. April 4, 2016). 
245 Nord v. Kelly, 520 F.3d 848, 855 (8th Cir. 2008). 
246 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1997). 
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materials. Oil plays a critical role in our daily lives; it fuels our 
cars and our homes and creates useful conveniences such as 
plastics. Hazardous materials like oil are “essential to the economy 
of the United States and the well being (sic) of its people.”247 That 
being said, the efficient transportation of oil is not—nor should it 
be—the only concern of the federal government.  
It is the duty of federal courts to uphold the law. It was Chief 
Justice Marshall who originally held that Indian tribes were 
“distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, 
from time immemorial.248 Although tribes no longer retain such 
broad “natural rights,” the trust relationship and the canons of 
construction preserve the sense of duty and responsibility to tribes 
within the United States. 
Even if the BIA’s interpretation of its newly promulgated rules 
stands under Montana, it faces another stiff test when rights-of-
way on railroads or other methods of transportation are challenged 
as preempted under the ICCTA. And they will be. For all parties 
involved and those Indian tribes not directly involved, Swinomish 
v. BNSF is an important case. On the merits, it has the potential to 
drastically decrease crude oil transportation or severely diminish 
the scope of tribal and BIA authority. Courts should embrace the 
canons of construction and the trust relationship and give 
deference to the Tribe’s authority under the Treaty of Point Elliott 
and the IRWA. According to the Swinomish Tribe, acceptance that 
the ICCTA preempts the IRWA means that it would “eviscerate 
the IRWA and render it meaningless” if the shipper could show 
that the contract interfered with its needs and interstate 
commerce.249  
Tribes should expressly reserve tribal dominion or control and 
assert that any contract constitutes a consensual relationship 
between the tribe and the entity with which it is contracting. The 
Tribe should attempt to include provisions in any right-of-way 
contract which clearly limit and prescribe the grant of the right-of-
way. Most importantly, the tribe should recognize that the 
unilateral “right” to termination within BIA’s new regulations may 
not be absolute even if it is so stated in the contract.  
                                                                                                             
247 Hazardous Materials: Transportation of Explosive by Rail, 68 Fed. Reg. 
34,370, 34,472 (June 9, 2003). 
248 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). 
249 Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 13, at 15. 
